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Common Law and Equity in R3RUE
Lionel Smith∗
Abstract
One of the most remarked-upon achievements of the first Restatement
of the Law of Restitution was the consolidation into a single treatment of all
of the law that concerned the Reporters, whether it came from common law
or Equity. In the Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment
(R3RUE), there was initially an even more dramatic idea: to restate the
law without even any reference to the historical distinction between
common law and Equity. In the final product, however, there are several
references to the peculiarly Equitable origins of certain juridical solutions
to the problems addressed by this Restatement. The goal of this Article is to
take a critical look at this evolution in the drafting of R3RUE. Ought the
Reporter to have kept to the original idea, which would have perfected, in a
sense, the accomplishment of the first Restatement? Or, is there a good
reason to continue to distinguish between common law and Equity, even
while we know very well that in at least some dimensions, the dichotomy is
little more than an accident of history? This Article argues that there are
some respects in which common law and Equity remain fundamentally and
substantively different. For the moment, full fusion therefore rests in a state
of impossibility. Fusion is achievable; but the road is rockier than most
jurists realize. Some of the differences between common law and Equity
are profound, and bridging them requires not just translation but also a
kind of transliteration. The rewards of such an exercise, however, would be
rich. When we can accurately describe and distinguish between the nature
of an Equitable interest in property and a common law interest in property,
without using those merely jurisdictional labels, we will be ready to
comprehend all of private law within a single organizing system.

∗ James McGill Professor of Law and Director, Quebec Research Centre of Private
and Comparative Law, McGill University.
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I. Introduction
The Restatement of the Law of Restitution: Quasi-Contracts and
Constructive Trusts1 achieved many things. One of them was to
consolidate into a single treatment all of the law that concerned the
Reporters, whether it came from common law or Equity.2 This was the
subject of a great deal of positive commentary at the time.3 Andrew Kull
has shown, in a moving study, that the impetus for this unification came
from the largely unpublished work of James Barr Ames, and that it was
built on his deep learning in both the common law and the civil law
traditions.4
In the Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment
(R3RUE), there was initially an even more dramatic idea: to restate the law
without even any reference to the historical distinction between common
law and Equity. In the final product, however, there are several references
to the peculiarly Equitable origins of certain juridical solutions to the
problems addressed by this Restatement, namely the law of unjust

1. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF RESTITUTION:
QUASI-CONTRACTS AND
CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS (1937).
2. Warren A. Seavey & Austin W. Scott, Restitution, 54 L.Q.REV. 29, 39–42 (1938).
In this Article, it is necessary to distinguish the system of legal principles that derive from
the Court of Chancery, and so are "equitable" in a technical sense, from the wider idea of
equity which also informs the part of the law of unjust enrichment that finds its origins in the
common law. With this goal in mind, Equity and Equitable are used for the former sense,
while equity and equitable are used for the latter sense.
3. See Andrew Kull, Restitution and Reform, 32 S. ILL. U. L.J. 83, 88 n.17 (2007)
(collecting citations from contemporary reviews).
4. See generally Andrew Kull, James Barr Ames and the Early Modern History of
Unjust Enrichment, 25 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 297 (2005).
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enrichment and the remedies therefor, and the remedies available to take
away the profits of wrongdoing.5
The goal of this Article is to take a critical look at this evolution in the
drafting of R3RUE. Ought the Reporter to have kept to the original idea,
which would have perfected, in a sense, the accomplishment of the first
Restatement? Or, is there a good reason to continue to distinguish between
common law and Equity, even while we know very well that, in at least
some dimensions, the dichotomy is little more than an accident of history?
This Article argues that there are some respects in which common law and
Equity remain fundamentally and substantively different. For the moment,
full fusion therefore rests in a state of impossibility. Fusion is achievable;
but the road is rockier than most jurists realize. Some of the differences
between common law and Equity are profound, and bridging them requires
not just translation but also a kind of transliteration. The rewards of such
an exercise, however, would be rich.
Everyone knows that the incidents of an Equitable interest in property
are fundamentally different from the incidents of a common law interest in
property. For example, in resolving a priority dispute, the classification of
competing interests as legal or Equitable is an essential first step, for the
applicable priority rules are different in the two cases. But those labels are
merely jurisdictional. Their continued importance reveals that we are far
from having a single organizing system. If we arrived at a point where we
could describe and discuss legal and Equitable property interests, including
their creation, characteristics, transfer, and destruction, without using those
merely jurisdictional labels, we would be ready to comprehend all of
private law within a single organizing system.
II. Theorizing Equity
The law that comes from Equity has not been as thoroughly theorized
as the common law. The nineteenth century saw a flourishing of textbooks
in the common law world, particularly in England but also in the U.S. Of
course, the common law had long had great books, going back to the one
5. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT §§ 4, 24, 45, 63,
66 (2011). These Sections make explicit reference to Equity or doctrines characterized as
Equitable. However, this does not mean that such doctrines are limited to their traditional
fields, as will be discussed below. On the other hand, wholly Equitable doctrines are
restated without identifying their jurisdictional origins in Sections 55, 57–59.
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known as Bracton in the thirteenth century, and following through the
centuries with dozens of works. Some were justly famous like those of
Littleton, Coke and Blackstone; many more were less so—less justly
famous, or less famous, justly or not. But there was something new in the
crop of books that appeared in the nineteenth century, in which we find
Anson, Pollock, Chitty, and Story. This was a vocation to lead the judges,
rather than to follow them. These were books that took it upon themselves
to order the law in ways that could not be found in the law itself.6 Many of
their authors were inspired by the developed systems in the civil-law world.
The timing was not accidental. The civil law had always been
systematic in its organization, and the most learned of common lawyers
knew something, or a great deal, of the civil law. It is true that, for
centuries, the systematic nature of the civil law was somewhat
schizophrenic. The vast bulk of the civil law was in the Digest, which is
not systematic at all, and whose ordering is no more logical than the
alphabetical Abridgements of the medieval common law. The system of
the civil law was in the Institutes, those of Justinian and those of Gaius on
which Justinian’s were modelled. But the Institutes were an overview, an
outline with little substance, intended for and primarily used by students.
The Roman jurists were not systematic in the sense that modern lawyers
mean by this word; they did not envision their legal system as built up from
elements (such as consent or will, rights, and obligations), each of which
could be understood as based upon abstract foundations; they were more
like early common lawyers, in understanding the law primarily from the
perspective of the actions available to litigants.7
Later civilian jurists found other systematic inspiration, and the
sixteenth century saw the beginning of systematization of the civil law in

6. To be fair to Sir William Blackstone, his Commentaries of the late eighteenth
century certainly did so as well. Although this work was hugely influential, his scheme for
ordering all the law in terms of rights and wrongs never gained acceptance. Blackstone also
had relatively little to say about Equity, and so his important contribution does not
undermine my point here. See Peter Birks, Rights, Wrongs, and Remedies, 20 OXFORD J.
LEGAL STUD. 1 (2000) (offering a profound study of Blackstone’s achievement); ALAN
WATSON, ROMAN LAW AND COMPARATIVE LAW 166–81 (1991) (arguing that Blackstone’s
system was indirectly derived from Justinian’s Institutes).
7. See HENRY S. MAINE, DISSERTATIONS ON EARLY LAW AND CUSTOM 389 (1883)
("So great is the ascendency [sic] of the Law of Actions in the infancy of Courts of Justice,
that substantive law has at first the look of being gradually secreted in the interstices of
procedure; and the early lawyer can only see the law through . . . its technical forms.").

COMMON LAW AND EQUITY IN R3RUE

1189

the modern understanding of that idea.8 This systematization developed in
the succeeding centuries in the hands of great natural lawyers like Hugo
Grotius and Samuel Pufendorf, and then those of such scholars as Jean
Domat and Robert-Joseph Pothier; and it reached new heights during the
nineteenth century, the heyday of codification. Napoleon’s Civil Code, a
masterpiece of legislation, came into force in 1804. To call it a masterpiece
does not mean that it is flawless, but is only to acknowledge its enormous
influence in Europe and beyond, and the fact that it remains in force, little
changed, even while the Republic of France has changed constitutions
many times during the same period. The French Civil Code incorporates
not only the ius commune, derived from the Digest; it also codifies elements
of local customary laws that were in force, particularly in the north of
France, at the time of codification.9 But it takes this substance, this blend of
customary law and ius commune covering all of private law, puts it into a
deceptively accessible linguistic register, and organizes it according to a
simple—perhaps too simple—table of contents. All of private law in a little
book: this was an inspiring project. The Germans would undertake their
own codification project, conceived rather differently, later in the same
century.10
And in the course of that century, there was a development that was
tremendously important for the intellectual history of the common law.
This was the abolition of the forms of action.11 The forms of action were
procedural packages that governed every aspect of the claims of litigants.
The difference between two forms of action was not just the difference
between two different kinds of claim. Two different forms of action might
have different processes for getting the defendant into court, and different
8. See Peter Stein, The Quest for a Systematic Civil Law, 90 PROC. BRIT. ACAD. 147,
154 (1995). Stein identified the French humanist scholars of the sixteenth century as the
first systematizers: "For the first time the content of Justinian’s law was separated from its
form, for the humanist systematisers combined enormous respect for the substance of
Roman law, with complete disregard for the way it was presented." Id. By contrast, JAMES
GORDLEY, FOUNDATIONS OF PRIVATE LAW: PROPERTY, TORT, CONTRACT, UNJUST
ENRICHMENT 7–14 (2006) gave pride of place to the contemporaneous Spanish natural law
school (or late scholastics) as the first systematizers. "[T]hey were the first to give Roman
law a theory and a systematic doctrinal structure." Id. at 9.
9. KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KÖTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 87–89
(Tony Weir trans., 3d ed. 1998).
10. Id. at 143–57.
11. In England, this process was gradual and was not completed until the Judicature
Acts 1873–1875. In the United States the crucial first step was the Field Code in New York,
enacted in 1850, which was adopted in many states and influenced the English reforms.
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rules for how long the defendant could delay the proceedings. Crucially,
they might have different rules for how the plaintiff went about proving his
claim. And they might certainly have different rules about what orders the
court could make, should the plaintiff succeed. Precedents on one form of
action were not relevant to another. Much of the development of the
common law was in terms, not of whether a plaintiff had a certain right, but
of whether he could be allowed to use a certain form of action.12 Upon
their abolition, common lawyers began to think instead in terms of causes
of action.
True, Maitland famously said, "The forms of action we have buried,
but they still rule us from their graves."13 We might imagine that he meant
little had changed. This would be a misunderstanding of the event and of
his interpretation of it. They still rule us, because all lawyers have to
categorize grievances; it is the only way to have a legal system based on
principle rather than instinct. The abolition of the forms of action gave no
license to modify the substantive law, and so the learning as to what
counted as an actionable grievance—the reason for an action, or a "cause of
action"—did not change. That is why, still today, people talk about claims
in replevin or in conversion. But there was a very important change, in that
there was now only one law of civil procedure for all claims. This allowed
the substantive law to emerge from the civil procedure that had previously
dominated the attention of jurists.14 In Maitland’s conclusion:
This results in an important improvement in the statements of the law—
for example in text-books—for the attention is freed from the
complexity of conflicting and overlapping systems of precedents and
can be directed to the real problem of what are the rights between man
and man, what is the substantive law.15

12. See generally FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, ALFRED H. CHAYTOR & WILLIAM J.
WHITTAKER, EQUITY; ALSO THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW: TWO COURSES OF
LECTURES (1929).
13. Id. at 296.
14. The law of real property had always been the most systematized part of the law,
but it was also dominated by procedural considerations, leading as in other fields to the need
to resort to legal fictions to develop the law. For an example, see SIR JOHN BAKER, AN
INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 301–03 (4th ed. 2002).
15. MAITLAND, supra note 12, at 375. Also see the introduction to SIR FREDERICK
POLLOCK, THE LAW OF TORTS vi (2d ed. 1890), framed as a letter to Oliver Wendell Holmes
Jr.: "The really scientific treatment of principles begins only with the decisions of the last
fifty years; the development belongs to that classical period of our jurisprudence which in
England came between the Common Law Procedure Act [1852] and the Judicature Act
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When those textbooks were written, their authors were frequently
inspired by the civil law, which, as we have seen, had renewed and
developed its systematic foundations in the preceding centuries, and in
particular in the preceding decades. The very first page of Chitty on
Contracts16 draws on Roman law and on the French author Robert-Joseph
Pothier as it discusses the idea of an obligation.17 John Austin developed a
distinction between primary and secondary rights that was almost certainly
borrowed from Pothier.18 And the common law of private international
law, systematized in the same period, uses categories of moveable and
immovable property that are foreign to the domestic common law but
fundamental to the civil law.19
There were textbooks on Equity, too, but there was no systematic civil
law to which the authors could look. The civil law has and had an idea of
equity, of course; but not a body of Equity.20 It should come as no surprise
that for many decades, the textbooks on Equity did not aspire to lead, but
only to follow. They did not systematize, except where the judges did.
Still today, we have a basic classification of trusts that can only be
described as bizarre: express, resulting, and constructive trusts. It comes
from the Statute of Frauds, drafted by Lord Nottingham L.C. and enacted in

[1873]." The Common Law Procedure Act was one of the crucial steps in the abolition of
the forms of action.
16. See JOSEPH CHITTY, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS NOT
UNDER SEAL 1 (2d ed. 1834).
17. See WILLIAM R. ANSON, PRINCIPLES OF THE ENGLISH LAW OF CONTRACT 4–5
(1879) (referring to Roman law and to the German jurist Fredrich C. von Savigny in order to
examine the idea of obligation); FREDERICK POLLOCK, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT AT LAW AND
IN EQUITY 4–5, 10 (2d ed. 1878) (bringing in German law and Roman law to analyze the
idea of agreement, and noticing French and German law on the question whether we are
concerned in contract law with subjective intention, or objective manifestations of intention).
18. See ROBERT J. POTHIER, TRAITÉ DES OBLIGATIONS § 183 (1761) (distinguishing
obligations primitives from obligations secondaires in the context of contractual penalty
clauses). These became primary and secondary obligations in the hands of William D.
Evans, one of Pothier’s most influential translators into English. Bernard Rudden,
Correspondence, 10 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 288, 288 (1990). Austin expanded the idea of
primary rights to the extracontractual context, although he preferred "sanctioning" right to
"secondary" right. JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 45–46 (4th ed. 1873).
19. See ALAN WATSON, JOSEPH STORY AND THE COMITY OF ERRORS: A CASE STUDY IN
CONFLICT OF LAWS 93 (1992); Blaine Baker, Interstate Choice of Law and Early-American
Constitutional Nationalism: An Essay on Joseph Story and the Comity of Errors, 38
MCGILL L.J. 454 (1993).
20. See supra note 2 for the distinction between Equity and equity in this Article.
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1677.21 Only recently, one might say in the last twenty years, do we see
books on Equity and trusts that look critically at their subject matter, and do
not simply describe what the courts do, but ask whether it can be made
sense of. And these are not the leading texts, most of which originated in
the nineteenth century and have been through multiple editions; they are
newer books. The leading texts on Equity and trusts, those with a pedigree
of over a century, tend to avoid systematization.22 The same phenomenon
is evident in relation to private international law: the common law of
private international law was inspired and informed by the civil law, but the
civil law does not have Equity, and only very recently has there been
thought given to what might be the rules for choice of law in relation to
many doctrines of Equity.23 Much of the early work of that genius of
analytical jurisprudence, Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, was inspired by a
desire to understand the relationship between common law and Equity.24
Arguably, however, he never quite came to the point of using his justly
famous fundamental legal conceptions to analyze the nature of the
beneficiary’s interest under a trust.25 This was a subject that preoccupied
21. Lionel Smith, Constructive Trusts and Constructive Trustees, 58 CAMBRIDGE L.J.
294, 297–98 (1999).
22. See RODERICK P. MEAGHER, JOHN D. HEYDON, & MARK J. LEEMING, MEAGHER,
GUMMOW, AND LEHANE’S EQUITY DOCTRINES AND REMEDIES (4th ed. 2002) (showing an
entirely self-conscious reactionism, especially in the Preface, to late 20th century projects of
systematizing Equity). This book does not have 19th century roots; its first edition dates
from 1975. The state of New South Wales, however, where the book was published, did not
enact the Judicature Act reform, combining the administration of the common law with that
of Equity, until 1972. The book, therefore, reflects a pre-Judicature approach to Equity.
23. See generally, e.g., TIONG MIN YEO, CHOICE OF LAW FOR EQUITABLE DOCTRINES
(2004). The choice of law rules for trusts are better developed in the United States than
elsewhere in the common law world, via the Restatements of the American Law Institute.
24. See Wesley N. Hohfeld, The Relations Between Equity and Law, 11 MICH. L. REV.
537, 537–572 (1913).
25. See id. at 555–56 (touching on the subject, but only through the use of some
examples, and not engaging the question occupying so many of his contemporaries—
whether the beneficiary’s right was in rem or in personam); see also Wesley N. Hohfeld,
Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16,
20 (1913). Hohfeld states: "A later article will deal specially with the analysis of certain
typical and important interests of a complex character—more particularly trusts and other
equitable interests." In that second article, Hohfeld mainly developed the idea of "paucital
rights" and "multital rights" as his elucidation of the best way to understand the distinction
between rights in personam and rights in rem. See Wesley N. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal
Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710 (1917). He did show, at
the very end, that beneficiaries’ rights are multital (in rem). Id. at 763–66. This passage is
marked, however, by some confusion, as Hohfeld treats the holder of a legal contingent
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legal thought in his day, and that is now attracting further attention as legal
scholars seek, finally, to theorize the law of trusts in a way that will allow it
to be understood as part of the same system that incorporates the rest of
private law.26
III. Equity and the Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment
The Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment started
with what might be called a radical fusionist project, in which the language
of Equity would disappear. The final text represents a more modest project.
My argument to this point is that systematizing Equity is unfinished
business. In other words, the field of Equity (and particularly of the law of
trusts) has not been described in the kind of juristic language that is used to
describe all the rest of private law. To talk of "equitable interests" is to
describe something with a purely historical label. This observation helps us
to understand why, in some parts of the common law world (although not
so much in the United States), there is a live issue about the fusion of
common law and Equity: whether it is a good idea, whether it is even
possible.27 It may seem very odd to some lawyers that anyone would
question fusion. But fusion skepticism has more than one foundation. It is
based partly on logic. The fusion of common law and Equity was a
procedural step. No one’s substantive rights were changed by any fusion of
the courts. Moreover, there is a very real sense in which the mission of
Equity is precisely to differ from the common law because Equity has
always been understood as, in some sense, corrective of the common law.
remainder alongside a trust beneficiary. Id. He fails to engage fully with the difficult point
that a trust beneficiary does not generally have any claim against a tortfeasor who damages
the trust property, and ultimately says that "[t]he nature of the equitable rights, privileges,
powers, and immunities of the cestui que trust is too large a subject for adequate treatment in
the present place; and so any further consideration of that interesting subject must be
reserved for another occasion." Id. at 766. However, Hohfeld died in 1918. Note that the
two Yale Law Journal articles were later published as a book, of which there are several
editions such as W.N. HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN
JUDICIAL REASONING (1964).
26. See generally, e.g., Robert Chambers, Constructive Trusts in Canada, 37 ALBERTA
L. REV. 173 (1999); Ben McFarlane & Robert Stevens, The Nature of Equitable Property, 4
J. EQUITY 1 (2010); Lionel Smith, Unravelling Proprietary Restitution, 40 CANADIAN BUS.
L.J. 317 (2004).
27. There was a conference on the subject in Sydney in 2004, leading to the
publication of SIMONE DEGELING & JAMES EDELMAN, EQUITY IN COMMERCIAL LAW (2005).

1194

68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1185 (2011)

Hence, a substantive fusion would seem to contradict the reason for which
Equity arose. Substantive fusion, though, can be understood in different
ways. Just as the procedural abolition of the forms of action at common
law led to the systematization of that legal order,28 so too the procedural
fusion of law and Equity arguably requires their conceptual integration into
a single legal order. This may point in the direction of a kind of fusion that
requires all of the private law to be made sense of within a single
conceptual framework; the doctrines of Equity will survive, but our
understanding of them will be more systematic. Fusion skepticism is also
based on conservatism: the preservation of the distinctness of Equity is
important to many.29 This conservatism plays out in many ways, including
in how the subject is taught in law faculties.30
In this Section, I will seek to assess the fusion project in the R3RUE
via two three-fold classifications of Equity: an old and well-established
one, that dates, it seems, from the eighteenth century; and a new one,
recently proposed by Andrew Burrows to organize our thinking about
fusion.31
The old classification seems to have originated with John
Fonblanque’s notes in his annotated editions of the eighteenth century
Treatise of Equity attributed to Henry Ballow, although it was adopted and
popularized by Joseph Story and others.32 In this sense, it is a rare example
of a scheme of systematization of Equity that did not come from the courts.
It divides the jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery into three parts: original
or exclusive, concurrent, and auxiliary. The original jurisdiction refers to
situations where the plaintiff’s only right is Equitable. The rights of a
beneficiary under a trust are the clearest example. The plaintiff typically
has no right at all at common law, and if he does not have an Equitable
28. See supra notes 11–15 and accompanying text.
29. See Lionel Smith, Fusion and Tradition, in EQUITY IN COMMERCIAL LAW 19
(Simone Degeling & James Edelman eds., 2005).
30. It was Maitland’s comment on how Equity should be taught that engaged the
attention of Hohfeld. See Hohfeld, supra note 24, at 537–40. Maitland’s famous book was
not written as a book but is based on student notes from his series of law school lectures.
Supra note 12. Today, there are still books and law school courses entitled Equity in some
places, but not in others.
31. See Andrew Burrows, We Do This at Common Law But That in Equity, 22
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2002).
32. See Mike Macnair, Equity and Conscience, 27 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 659, 664–
66 (2007) (offering a brief history of the classification, which was challenged and modified
by many authors).
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recourse then he has nothing at all. The concurrent jurisdiction refers to the
case where the plaintiff has a legal right and yet goes to Equity for some
remedy that the common law cannot provide. Injunctions and specific
performance are the core examples.33 The plaintiff has a common law right
that the defendant perform his contractual promise, or that the defendant
stay off the plaintiff’s land; but the common law deals almost exclusively in
damages, and so the plaintiff may go to Equity for those remedies that
command the defendant to do or not to do something other than the
payment of money. The auxiliary jurisdiction is a bit more obscure, and
refers primarily to pretrial procedure. Even in relation to a lawsuit at
common law, the Court of Chancery could order the production of
documents, which common law courts could not. Pretrial discovery of
documents, and a great deal else of our modern civil procedure, comes from
the Chancery.
The classification has not been a particularly successful one and little
is heard of it today, but in one respect it focuses attention on an important
point. Some, but only some, of the recourses provided by Equity are, to this
day, discretionary. Specific performance is a good example. This
discretionary character can be made sense of, at least in part, inasmuch as
the plaintiff has a right to compensatory damages whether or not she is able
to secure a decree of specific performance. For the same reason, in relation
to such decrees, the orthodox principle is that the plaintiff has to show that
the common law recourse, which by hypothesis is available, is in some way
inadequate. This leads some people to generalize, to the effect that there is
something inherently discretionary about Equity, or that Equitable remedies
only arise where common law remedies are inadequate. But neither of
these ideas has any relevance in the exclusive jurisdiction. There is no
whiff of judicial discretion anywhere in the basic principles of the law of
express trusts; it is all a matter of rights.34 And this is not surprising,
inasmuch as if Equity does not help a trust beneficiary, she typically has no
possibility of common law recourse.
The other three-fold classification, posited by Andrew Burrows, is not
intended simply as a way of organizing the jurisdiction of Equity, but as a
way of organizing a project of substantive (and not merely procedural)
fusion between the common law and Equity. Burrows divides the private
33. Others might include subrogation and marshalling.
34. Unless the terms of the trust create discretions, a state of affairs which has become
the norm; but this is discretion in the trustees, not the court.
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law—the common law and Equity together—into three areas. The first is
the field in which the common law and Equity coexist coherently, and in
which retaining separate labels still provides "the best or, at least, useful
terminology."35 In this category he places the trust, and also "the general
priority rule that a bona fide purchaser for value of a legal interest without
notice takes free of a prior equitable interest in the same property."36 As he
notes, it is difficult to describe this rule without using the labels "common
law" and "equitable" to categorize the interests held by the competing
parties, because the rule is based on precisely such a categorization.
Burrows’s second category covers situations where, as in the first
category, the common law and Equity coexist coherently, but unlike in the
first category, the traditional designations of "common law" and "equitable"
are superfluous. One of his examples is the subject of threats or pressure
that induce a contract or gift and may allow it to be set aside. The common
law always had a doctrine of duress; Equity added the idea of undue
influence, allowing some transactions to be set aside that the common law
would not. But, he argues, nothing is gained by perpetuating the historical
labels. We might as well just list all the threats or pressure that allow a
transaction to be avoided. Although he does not specifically place it in this
category, the law of specific performance and injunctions seems to belong
here as well. We might formulate the traditional sentence, "where the
defendant has breached a contract, the plaintiff has a right to compensatory
damages at common law; but in Equity, as a matter of discretion, he may
get a decree of specific performance." This proposition could be
reformulated, "where the defendant has breached a contract, the plaintiff
has a right to compensatory damages; but, as a matter of discretion, he may
get a decree of specific performance." This category, one might say, lends
itself easily to a kind of terminological fusion, without any effect on the
substance of the law.37
Burrows’s third category comprises situations in which, in his view,
the common law and Equity are different, at least slightly so, and, unlike in
the first category, this difference is not a useful or justifiable one.38 The
35. Burrows, supra note 31, at 5.
36. Id.
37. Of course not everyone would agree with this. The traditional position would be
that the retention of the label "Equitable" keeps the jurisdiction to award specific
performance in intellectual contact with the whole body of Equity, which has its own
internal logic.
38. Burrows, supra note 31, at 6–7.
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result is that in this third category, the common law and Equity do not
coexist coherently. The differences need to be ironed out. Substantive
fusion is needed. Burrows gives many examples, including the law on
compound interest (which in English law is only available for Equitable
claims), and the law of tracing (which in English law is thought by many to
differ as between "common law tracing" and "Equitable tracing").39 As
Burrows acknowledges, the difference between his first and third categories
is a matter of judgement: if one believes that there is a good justification
for a difference between the common law and Equity, one will place the
matter in the first category, otherwise in the third.40
Although he does not mention the older classification, it is interesting
to observe that Burrows’s first category, where he would provisionally
accept that the law remain in its traditional state, lines up closely, if not
exactly, with the "exclusive" jurisdiction of that older classification.
Similarly, even those who are critical of the coherence of the older
classification are likely to accept that there is a crucial distinction between
the exclusive jurisdiction and the rest of Equity.41
If we assess the fusion project of the R3RUE against Burrows’s
classification, we can speculate that he would approve of a great deal of
what is accomplished by the new Restatement. Perhaps exemplifying
Burrows’s second category, we see duress and undue influence brought
together in Sections 14 through 15 without any references to the legal or
Equitable origins of one or the other.42 Similarly, the R3RUE restates the
law of mistake in Sections 5 through 12 and 34 without reference to
common law or Equity. It goes so far as to overturn, in some cases, the
traditional doctrine that neither common law nor Equity will perfect an
imperfect gift.
Again, Section 13 restates the law of fraud and
misrepresentation, bringing together the law of fraud (that comes from the
common law) and the law of innocent misrepresentation (that comes from
Equity). Subrogation, most of which comes from Equity, is restated in
39. Id. at 7. But see LIONEL SMITH, THE LAW OF TRACING 174 (1997); Lionel Smith,
Simplifying Claims to Traceable Proceeds, 125 L.Q. REV. 338 (2009).
40. For example, Burrows suggests that an example of his third category is the
inconsistent treatment, in law and Equity, of misappropriated money (Burrows, supra note
31, at 7 n.26), but he has already placed the law of trusts in the first category, which suggests
that it is justifiable that the rights of a legal owner of money will not necessarily be the same
as the rights of a beneficiary of a trust or a legatee under an estate.
41. MEAGHER, HEYDON, & LEEMING, supra note 22, at 10–11.
42. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT §§ 14–15 (2011).
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Sections 24 and 57 in a way that uses the word "equitable" (Section 24 is
labelled "equitable subrogation") but that does not depend on any
jurisdictional distinctions for its content or the scope of its applicability.
Other elements of R3RUE could be said to illustrate Burrows’s third
category. That is, there are provisions that bring the common law
substantively in line with Equity, in situations where, at least on some
views of the law, there was traditionally a difference between them. Taking
some elements from among Burrows’s examples, we find that the law
relating to illegality43 and tracing44 are restated in a unified way.45 Perhaps
the strongest example is the restatement of the "unclean hands" doctrine in
Section 63. It is labelled "Equitable disqualification (unclean hands)," but it
is made to apply to any claim. This is a significant development from the
traditional position, according to which the doctrine applies only to the
enforcement of Equitable rights.
Finally, let us come to Burrows’s first category. Here Burrows argues
that the common law and Equity coexist coherently and the labels do need
to be perpetuated. Above, it was suggested that this category corresponds
to the original or exclusive jurisdiction of the traditional classification,
where a claimant has a purely Equitable right. The R3RUE in some ways
reflects Burrows’s position. One of his examples of this category is the
defence by which the purchase in good faith of a legal interest in property,
for value, without notice of a pre-existing Equitable interest, will defeat that
interest. We see this defence restated in Section 66, with explicit reference
to the legal (common law) and Equitable natures of the respective
interests.46
Burrows’s other example of his first category is the law of trusts, and
here the R3RUE presents some difficult questions. On the traditional view,
the trust belongs to the exclusive jurisdiction of Equity. A trust is an
obligation relating to the benefit of particular property, however that
43. Id. § 32.
44. Id. §§ 58–59.
45. Although some would argue that even in England and the rest of the common law
world, there is only one law of tracing. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
46. Conversely, the defence in Section 67 is for payments of money, where the
common law provided a good faith purchase defence that would defeat legal interests,
although it did not provide one for transfers of other kinds of property. The common law
defence always had different rules about what counted as value; in particular, a promise to
pay money is value at common law, but not for the purpose of the Equitable defence. The
R3RUE has apparently diminished protection of Equitable interests by restating value in
Section 68 in line with the common law defence.
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obligation may arise. If it arises by consent, it is an express trust; if it arises
by operation of law, it is a resulting or constructive trust.47 United States
law has for many years taken the position that the constructive trust is not
really a trust at all; it is only a remedy, explained by analogy to the law of
trusts.48 This view is echoed in R3RUE, where it restates constructive
trusts in Section 55. There it is suggested that not only is the constructive
trust not a trust; it is not even a remedy, but only "a manner of speaking."49
The suggestion that a constructive trust is not a trust is difficult to
understand if we note that it is, like all trusts, a relationship between people
with respect to property that arises out of the obligation of the owner of the
property to hold it for the benefit of the beneficiary. It is easier to
understand if we take a narrower definition of trust, that confines the word
"trust" to expressly created trusts.50 This is the view that seems to lie
behind such rhetorical devices as the claim that a constructive trust is no
more a trust than a quasi-contract is a contract. But the word "constructive"
indicates clearly that the constructive trust does not arise by a settlor’s
intention. The better formulation is that in the Restatement of the Law of
Restitution: Quasi-Contracts and Constructive Trusts—a constructive trust
differs from an express trust in much the same way as a quasi-contractual
obligation differs from a contractual obligation.51
This seems exactly right: both a contractual obligation and a quasicontractual obligation are obligations, but only the former arises by consent,
while the latter, by operation of law. So too, both the express and
constructive trusts are trusts, with trust property, trustees, and beneficiaries,
whose equitable interest gives them priority in the case of trustee
insolvency to the extent that trust property can be found. One arises by
consent, one by operation of law.
47. Ben McFarlane, The Centrality of Constructive and Resulting Trusts, in
CONSTRUCTIVE AND RESULTING TRUSTS 183 (C. Mitchell ed., 2009).
48. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF RESTITUTION:
QUASI-CONTRACTS AND
CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS § 160 cmt. a (1937); DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES 401 (1993);
1 AUSTIN W. SCOTT, WILLIAM F. FRATCHER, & MARK L. ASCHER, SCOTT AND ASCHER ON
TRUSTS § 2.1.1 (2006) (citing and following the Restatements of the Law of Trusts). Unlike
previous editions, Scott and Ascher on Trusts no longer deals with constructive trusts.
49. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 55 cmt. b
(2011).
50. This view is not significantly different from the view that a trust must
definitionally be a fiduciary relationship.
51. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF RESTITUTION:
QUASI-CONTRACTS AND
CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS § 160 (1937).
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If the claim that a constructive trust is not a real trust is merely a way
of saying that it does not arise by consent, then no one would disagree with
the conclusion, even if they might disagree with the terminology. But there
is a way of understanding the claim that is importantly different, and that
arises out of the suggestion that a constructive trust is "only a remedy."
That can be understood as the idea that its grant lies in the discretion of the
court, and it belongs conceptually not with express trusts, but with
injunctions and specific performance.52 In terms of the old classification of
Equity jurisdiction, this means that the constructive trust should not belong
in the exclusive jurisdiction, but in the concurrent jurisdiction. In modern
terms, this is just another way of saying that you do not get it as a matter of
right, but as a matter of discretion. And many cases, including many recent
cases, have accepted this vision of the "remedial constructive trust." The
trust is awarded in the discretion of the court, when it is shown that other
remedies are inadequate.53
But there is a paradox here, in that this proves too much, or at least
more than the Reporter of the R3RUE, Andrew Kull, wishes to prove. The
implication of the remedial view of constructive trusts, which lines them up
with injunctions and decrees of specific performance, is that, like
injunctions and decrees of specific performance, they are created by the
order of the judge. They do not exist before that time. This contrasts with
the view of constructive trusts that sees them as obligations with respect to
the benefit of property, arising by operation of law from unjust enrichment
or some other cause. On that view, the trust arises when the obligation
arises. This has enormous implications in bankruptcy. If a defendant
holding the contested property has become bankrupt, and before the
moment of bankruptcy, he held that property in trust, then the property does
not form part of the bankruptcy estate. That is the law everywhere. But if
the property does form part of the bankruptcy estate because it is not held in
trust, and a plaintiff appears before the judge and asks for an injunction that
the property be transferred to him, then the plaintiff appears not in the role
52. The analogy is drawn explicitly in the R3RUE. Section 55 Comment b indicates
that an order recognizing a constructive trust is a composite of a declaration and an
injunction. See Andrew Kull, Deconstructing the Constructive Trust, 40 CANDADIAN BUS.
L.J. 358, 360 (2004); John H. Langbein, The Conctractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105
YALE L.J. 625, 631 (1995) (describing the constructive trust as "a species of equitable
remedy, comparable in function to the injunction or the decree of specific performance").
53. The Supreme Court of Canada has certainly accepted this view. See, e.g., Kerr v.
Baranow, 2011 S.C.C. 10.
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of trust beneficiary; rather, he appears in the role of a creditor seeking to be
promoted above the others. His request will surely be denied because
bankruptcy seeks to treat all creditors equally. And if a constructive trust is
nothing but a kind of injunction, then the plaintiff who appears seeking a
constructive trust can expect to be treated in exactly the same way.54
Andrew Kull wants constructive trusts to provide priority in
bankruptcy, just as Austin Scott did.55 This presupposes that the plaintiff’s
trust interest exists before the bankruptcy.56 But this is precisely the
traditional or institutional view of constructive trusts, and on this view it is
very difficult to see what is left of the idea that the constructive trust is "just
a remedy." Kull’s view seems to be that the constructive trust arises from
the facts that create it, such as an unjust enrichment, and not from the court
order. The court order is only a declaration of what already exists. Again,
this is just like the traditional or institutional view of the constructive trust.
Kull’s understanding of the idea that the constructive trust is "just a
remedy" remains true, he argues, in the sense that the court’s order settles
what was otherwise a disagreement between the parties regarding what was
the pre-existing state of affairs.57 But this seems to mean that everything on
which a court passes judgment is just a remedy. Who owns an asset? Did a
corporation exist? Was an express trust, or a contract, created? Did the
defendant owe a duty of care, and if so, did he breach it? All these are
questions as to which there might be a disagreement that only a court can
settle. If this means they are all remedies, then the label does not tell us
much. "Remedy," it has been shown, is a word with very many meanings.58

54. For a well-known U.S. example, see In re Omegas Group, Inc., 16 F.3d 1443 (6th
Cir. 1994). A Canadian example is Bedard v. Schell, 59 Sask. R. 71 (Q.B. 1987).
55. Andrew Kull, Restitution in Bankruptcy: Reclamation and Constructive Trust, 72
AM. BANKR. L.J. 265, 287 n.54 (1998) (citing AUSTIN SCOTT, SCOTT ON TRUSTS § 462.4 (4th
ed. 2004)).
56. See id. at 287.
57. Id.
58. See Birks, supra note 6 (identifying five distinct senses of the word "remedy").
Indeed if the fact that a court passes judgment on a matter in dispute makes that matter or
that order a remedy, then even questions of fact would be remedies, or disputes about facts
would be resolved by remedies.
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IV. Conclusion

The contributions of Equity to the modern law are enormously
important. To say nothing of all of the law of trusts, it has given us
equitable liens, subrogation, tracing, discovery, and much else. The
integration of Equity and the common law is something that seems overdue
to many commentators. The R3RUE, like Andrew Burrows, takes the line
that this is a process that should have happened long ago, and that we
should move it along as quickly as can be. In my own view, that project is
premature. We cannot integrate the common law and Equity until we have
systematized Equity. We cannot put any Equitable doctrine into one of
Burrows’s categories until we understand it fully, and understand how it
relates to the neighbouring common law. It may be—and this would have
been Maitland’s view—that almost all of our law actually belongs in
Burrows’s second category.
The law of constructive trusts serves only as the most telling
illustration of this point. A legal realist approach led to the idea that it was
naïve to think that constructive trusts were really trusts. They were pushed
aside and treated as remedies. Not surprisingly, after decades of academic
commentary saying that they were not trusts but only remedies, some courts
took the view that they were not trusts but only remedies. This has led to
confusion and injustice. It has also led, in the United States, to the ejection
of constructive trusts from the subject of trust law, which is a mistake.
Constructive trusts give beneficiaries priority in the insolvency of the
trustee because constructive trusts are trusts. Terminology always matters
in the law.
A task for the future will be to analyze trusts—all of the law of
trusts—as carefully and as fully as we have analyzed the law of restitution
for unjust enrichment and the law of gain-based remedies for wrongful
conduct. Hohfeld started the job, and we need to finish it. The ultimate
result will be that we could, if we wanted to, describe all of the law of trusts
in a precise juridical terminology that would not depend on historical
distinctions between the common law and Equity. We could preserve the
substance, influence and genius of Equity even while dispensing with the
historical terminology that has been handed down to us. And this would, if
we wished it, allow us to achieve the unfulfilled goal of the R3RUE, to
restate any body of law without reference to the labels "common law" and
"Equity."

